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Abstract.   Turing wrote that the "guiding principle" of his investigation into the possibility 
of intelligent machinery was "The analogy [of machinery that might be made to show 
intelligent behavior] with the human brain." (Turing 1948)  In his discussion of the 
investigations that Turing said were guided by this analogy,  however, he employs a more far-
reaching analogy:  he eventually expands the analogy from the human brain out to "the human 
community as a whole."  Along the way, he takes note of an obvious fact in the bigger scheme 
of things regarding human intelligence:  grownups were once children; this leads him to 
imagine what a machine analogue of childhood might be.  In this paper, I'll discuss Turing's 
child-machine, what he said about different ways of educating it, and what impact the 
"bringing up" of a child-machine has on its ability to behave in ways that might be taken for 
intelligent.  I'll also discuss how some of the various games he suggested humans might play 
with machines are related to this approach.   
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1   A 'Guiding Principle' 
 
In his writings on intelligence and machinery, Turing often employs analogies.  One 
analogy he states explicitly and calls the "guiding principle" of his investigation into 
"possible ways in which machinery might be made to show intelligent behavior" is "the 
analogy with the human brain."  (Turing 1948) 
 
The analogy that Turing employs in the discussions that follow is not a simple analogy 
between machine and brain; it's more specific, and less physically-oriented, than the brief 
description of an analogy between computing machinery and the human brain quoted 
above might at first suggest.   Turing says his investigation is mainly concerned with the 
analogy between the ways in which a human [with a human brain] is educated such that 
the potentialities for human intelligence are realized, and "an analogous teaching process 
applied to machines."  (Turing 1948).    
 
That is, his investigation concerns identifying and evaluating proposals for filling in the 
part of the analogy that answers:  if we want a machine to fulfil its potentialities for 
intelligence, how should it be "educated"?   In his 1950 "Computing Machinery and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  +	   I should like to thank an anonymous referee for some helpful remarks, and the audience at the Fourth 
Regional Wittgenstein Workshop held at Washington and Lee University on March 11th, 2012 for 
discussion on this paper.    
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Intelligence", he spoke of dividing the problem of building a machine that can imitate the 
human mind into two parts:  "The child program and the education process."   He 
mentions yet a third component, on this approach:  "Other experience, not to be described 
as education, to which it [the machine] has been subjected."  That is, there is a distinction 
between "the education process" and "other experience."   But what is it that distinguishes 
the education process?  
 
 
2  Intelligent Behavior versus Completely Disciplined Behavior 
 
This analogy -- between a machine that has undergone an education process and a human 
student who has been educated by a teacher -- provides Turing with the means to respond 
to one of the most common objections raised against the possibility that a machine could 
be regarded as exhibiting intelligent behavior.  This objection (to the possibility of 
intelligent machinery) is, in Turing's words, the view that  "[i]nsofar as a machine can 
show intelligence this is to be regarded as nothing but a reflection of the intelligence of 
its creator."   That view, he says, is much like the view that "the credit for the discoveries 
of a pupil should be given to his teacher", which can be rebutted as follows:  
 
" In such a case the teacher would be pleased with the success of his methods of 
education, but would not claim the results themselves unless he had actually 
communicated them to his pupil.  He would certainly have envisaged in very broad 
outline the sort of thing his pupil might be expected to do, but would not expect to 
forsee any sort of detail. "  (Turing 1948, p. 2) 
 
Turing contrasts "intelligent behavior" of a machine with "completely disciplined 
behavior."  Both are exceptional sorts of behavior for a machine;  he says that "Most of 
the programmes which we can put into the machine will result in it doing something that 
we cannot make sense of at all,  or which we regard as completely random behavior."   
 
In both intelligent behavior and completely disciplined behavior, we are able to make 
sense of the machine's behavior.  But the kind of sense we make of it differs.  When a 
machine is carrying out computations,  the machine's behavior is "completely 
disciplined" and what we strive for is to have "a clear mental picture of the state of the 
machine at each moment in the computation." (Turing 1950, p. 459) When a teacher is 
educating a machine with an intent to produce an intelligent machine, the goal of the 
education process entails that some of the machine's rules of behavior will be undergoing 
change.  The teacher will be able "to some extent to predict the pupil's behavior", but, in 
contrast to the case of programming it to carry out computations, won't have a clear 
picture of what is going on within the machine being educated.  Intelligent behavior is not 
a large departure from completely disciplined behavior, but it does differ qualitatively 
from completely disciplined behavior:  the sense we make of it is distinctively different.  
Intelligent behavior escapes the predictability of completely disciplined machine 
behavior without veering off into random behavior.   
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One qualitative difference between completely disciplined behavior and intelligent 
behavior is the presence of initiative.  When describing a universal machine with no 
special programming but able to carry out whatever program is put into it, Turing 
remarks that after carrying out the actions specified by the program, it would sink into 
inactivity until another action is required.  It would lack initiative.  This is one reason that 
the universal computer, even if produced from a child-machine by some machine 
analogue of an education process to produce completely disciplined behavior, is not a 
good candidate for a machine analogue of a human --- even though the actions that it 
does take would be faultless.  Turing thinks that an intelligent machine will be fallible, 
and that the feature of fallibility can be (or might be an indication of something that is) an 
important advantage.  He also thinks that it might be required to have some sort of 
random element in a machine in order to produce a machine that is amenable to 
undergoing the kind of process that is analogous to the education of a human.    
 
So, randomness probably has a part to play in producing a machine that might possibly be 
said to exhibit intelligence.  Yet, intelligent machine behavior is not random behavior.  
The part that randomness plays in intelligent machinery is in the generation of 
possibilities among which some search process is then employed.  (Turing 1950, p. 459)  
Turing writes of using a random element to generate forms of behavior at one point 
(Turing 1950, p. 459); at another point he speaks of using a random element to generate 
different child-machines among which one then selects the best ones.  (Turing 1950, p. 
456).  However, in both places he indicates that random generation alone does not seem 
very efficient, and that he would expect to supplement the generation of alternatives or 
the search among alternatives with some more directed, more informed process.  Of the 
process of "finding" an appropriate child-machine, he writes:  
 
One may hope, however, that this process will be more expeditious than evolution.  
The survival of the fittest is a slow method for measuring advantages.  The 
experimenter, by the exercise of intelligence, should be able to speed it up.  Equally 
important is the fact that he is not restricted to random mutations.  If he can trace a 
cause for some of the weakness he can probably think of the kind of mutation which 
will improve it."  (Turing 1950, p. 456)  
 
And, of the education process, which aims to find the appropriate behavior:  
 
"The systematic method [of trying out different possibilities in the search for a 
solution] has the disadvantage that there may be an enormous block without any 
solutions in the region which has to be investigated first.  Now the learning process 
may be regarded as a search for a form of behaviour which will satisfy the teacher 
(or some other criterion).   Since there is probably a very large number of 
satisfactory solutions the random method seems to be better than the systematic." 
(Turing 1950, p. 459)  
 
The education process is a matter of "intervening" on the machine.  Just as the behavior 
of the early machines could be changed by using a screwdriver to change the machine's 
physical configuration by physical means, so the behavior of digital computers can be 
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changed by using communication with it to change its rules of operation in some way.  
These two kinds of intervention are referred to as "screwdriver intervention" and "paper 
intervention", respectively.   In "Intelligent Machinery", the guiding principle (the 
analogy mentioned earlier) is employed here, too -- with some qualifications.  Turing 
notes that human life is such that "interference is the rule rather than the exception."  He 
identifies which part of human life he means to compare to a machine that might be 
regarded as exhibiting intelligence:   
 
" [A human] is in frequent communication with other [humans], and is continually 
receiving visual and other stimuli which themselves constitute a form of 
interference.   It will only be when the [human] is'concentrating' with a view to 
eliminating these stimuli or 'distractions' that he approximates a machine without 
interference." (Turing 1948, p. 8; emphasis added) 
 
The human behavior during a time period when the human approximates a machine 
without interference, though, "is largely determined by the way he has been conditioned 
by previous interference."   
 
Since, as he says, humans are constantly undergoing interference, how is the analogy 
between humans and machines supposed to go here?  What is the difference between 
undergoing an education process and being intervened upon in other ways?  Well, he 
seems to think of education as a special kind of interference:  it involves a teacher who 
intentionally tries to affect the behavior of the machine.  It's interference directed towards 
some goal.  So, even though humans undergo interference as a rule as they go about their 
daily lives (except for the times when they withdraw and concentrate on something), we 
still want to distinguish the kind of interference that is education from other kinds of 
interference.   
 
The analogy may not be precise, but I think it is pretty clear:  humans undergo education 
processes for a portion of their lives (which Turing estimates at about the first twenty 
years of their lives), and their behavior after that is very much affected by the education 
they have received, even though they still receive other interference -- most of the time, 
in fact.  The point is to approximate the human process of education with some analogous 
process suitable for machines.  The major points of his proposal are that, on analogy with 
a human's life, we plan for these three stages of a machine:  first, there is the infant stage 
of a machine, which is a machine that has not been educated and is at least partly 
unorganized.  It need not be a blank slate, but it is important that large amounts of its 
behavior are undetermined.   This is followed by the child-machine stage, during which 
the machine is educated.  The first stage of education is to get the machine to a point 
where "it could be relied on to produce definite reactions to certain commands." (Turing 
1948, p. 118)   Education involves a teacher who is intentionally trying to teach or 
modify the machine's behavior to effect some specific kinds of behavior.  The machine's 
behavior is in flux during this time. Even if the machine is given the means to educate 
itself using some kind of program during the child-machine stage, there is still oversight 
and monitoring by a teacher of sorts who checks up on its progress and intervenes if 
necessary.  At some point the education can be ended, and the machine that results when 
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education is ended is supposed to behave in a way that can be predicted "in very broad 
outline" by someone familiar with how it has been educated --- but its behavior might 
not, in fact probably will not, be fully predictable.    Finally, there is the adult-machine, 
which is still capable of learning, but is also capable of quite complex behavior without 
additional intervention.   
 
What about a process that would start with an unorganized machine, which we would 
then 'organize' by suitable interference to be a universal machine (e.g., a digital computer 
capable of being programmed)?  Turing says that researchers should be interested in 
understanding the process that begins with an unorganized machine and results in a 
universal machine, but he doesn't regard such a process as the appropriate "analogous 
process" of human education:  a universal machine isn't really the behavioral analogue of 
an adult.  One of the differences between a human adult and a universal machine is the 
point mentioned above regarding the lack of initiative.   There are other reasons, too:  
such an adult-machine would "obey orders given in an appropriate language, even if they 
were very complicated; he would have no common sense, and would obey the most 
ridiculous orders unflinchingly." (Turing 1948, p. 116)  
 
Turing describes an experiment in "educating" machines he carried out.   It involved a 
process meant to be analogous to administering punishments and rewards; of giving the 
machine something analogous to pain and pleasure.  The machine to be educated in his 
experiment was one whose description was incomplete, as he put it, meaning that its 
actions were not yet fully specified; thus, the machine's operation would give rise to 
specific cases where the action called for is not determined.  When such a specific case 
arises, the following is done:  an action is selected randomly and applied tentatively, by 
making the appropriate entry in the machine's description.  This is the point where the 
teacher "educates" the machine.   
 
The general idea of employing pleasure and pain he has in mind is revealed in his 
discussion of "pleasure-pain systems."  We can get the general idea without getting into 
the details too much.  He is considering unorganized machines whose states are described 
using two expressions, one of which he calls "character":  "Pleasure interference tends to 
fix the character, i.e., towards preventing it changing, whereas pain stimuli tend to disrupt 
the character, causing features which had become fixed to change, or to become again 
subject to random variation."   When he describes the particular experiment he carried 
out, though, which he refers to as a "particular type of pain-pleasure system", the analogy 
seems to employ the brain-machine analogy quite directly:  "When a pain stimulus occurs 
all tentative entries are cancelled, and when a pleasure stimulus occurs they are all made 
permanent." (Turing 1948, p. 118)    At the time, he found it took too much work to 
pursue this means of educating a machine much farther than the rather simplified version 
of it he had carried out.   
 
As his friend and colleague Donald Michie put it, they were waiting for hardware.  
Michie recounts a story about one of Turing's plans to program the "Manchester Baby" to 
investigate what would happen when two different programs for playing chess were pit 
against each other: "[Turing] was thwarted (rightly) by . . . the guardian of its scarce 
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resources, Tom Kilburn."  According to Michie, in the years leading up to Turing's 1948 
and 1950 papers on intelligent machinery, Michie, Turing, and Jack Good "formed a sort 
of discussion club focused around Turing's astonishing 'child machine' concept. 1 His 
proposal was to use our knowledge of how the brain acquires its intelligence as a model 
for designing a teachable intelligent machine."  (Michie 2002)  The idea that the source 
of learning might be sought in some random elements of neural physiology was well-
known in psychology; decades earlier, in his Principles of Psychology, William James 
had concluded a discussion on the formation of pathways in the brain: " All this is vague 
to the last degree, and amounts to little more than saying that a new path may be formed 
by the sort of chances that in nervous material are likely to occur." (James, 1890, p. 104)  
The discussion club worked on developing the analogy for machines; one might say that 
what they were doing in that discussion club was developing the basic ideas of what has 
since become known as reinforcement learning.  Michie later showed that reinforcement 
learning could indeed be successfully carried out in machines, proving sceptics wrong. 
(Michie 1961)  In 1948, though, there was still a "wait for hardware", and having to wait 
for the hardware to be available to test their ideas must have been frustrating.   
 
Turing also outlined other approaches he would have liked to try: one might program 
one's "teaching policies" into the machine, and let it run for awhile,  modifying its own 
programs, and periodically check to see how much progress it has made in its education.  
He regarded the problem of building a machine that would display "initiative" as well as 
"discipline" (as he put it) as crucial.  Achieving discipline in a machine:  that we can see 
how to do.  What initiative adds to discipline in a machine:  this is a matter of comparing 
humans and machines with complete discipline, and asking what humans that are able to 
communicate had in addition to discipline.  Then, one could address what it was that 
should be copied in the machine.  A question remained as to what process to use that 
achieves ending up with a machine that had both.   In particular, in what order should 
these two be instilled in the machine:  first, discipline, then initiative, or somehow both 
together?   
 
 
3  Teachers, singular and plural 
 
In most of Turing's examples of a teacher educating a machine, it seems he is thinking of 
one or at most a few individual teachers.  The kind of machine under consideration is a 
universal (i.e., programmable) machine, specifically, a digital computer, equipped with a 
means of "at most, organs of sight, speech, and hearing."  His investigations are, as a 
result, biased towards activities that "require little contact with the outside world." 
(Turing 1948, p. 117)  There are other obstacles, too:  even if a machine were equipped 
with the ability to navigate physically, there are limitations on its abilities to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  Turing actively sought out discussion with colleagues.  Another such colleague was the philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose seminar he attended.  For Turing's 'contructive uses' of their discussions, see 
Floyd (to appear). 
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socialized.   More than once, he mentions the advantage that human learners have in that 
they are able to benefit from interactions with other humans.2   
 
It is interesting that a major piece of research in cultural anthropology on cross-cultural 
features of child-rearing appeals to neural processes very much in line with Turing's 
"pain-pleasure systems", except that it is evaluations of goodness and badness, rather than 
physical pleasure and physical pain, that are administered.   What is interesting is that this 
work (Quinn 2003) provides a model of what the education process of a human child 
would be on the "it takes a village to raise a child" view:  "Cultural models of child 
rearing, thus, exploit the neural capacities of the children so reared, to achieve a result, 
adulthood, that could not be accomplished by the human brain alone."   One can see the 
kind of issues this might raise:  what if different members of the community contradict 
each other?  This is exactly the issue ("constancy of [the child's] experience") that the 
cultural anthropologists in (Quinn 2003) discovered was universally deemed important.   
 
Turing does not talk about this kind of education -- education by a community, or 
education constrained and informed by cultural norms -- of a child-machine, but he does 
talk about the role of the human community in the intellectual activity of humans.  It 
occurs in his discussion of initiative.  In that discussion, by the time he got to talking 
about human community, he had already treated the issues of discipline and initiative 
separately, and the education of the child-machine had been limited to the instillation of 
discipline into the machine.  Yet, given that he did, albeit very briefly, indicate that the 
analogy between brain and machine might involve how the human community is 
involved in the education process of a human, the question of an analogue for a 
community as teacher during the education process of a machine arises quite naturally.  
 
We might ask, what kind of community?  Turing considered digital computers that have 
"organs" for sight, speech, and hearing.  The newest cellphones (e.g., equipped with Siri) 
have such "organs", and they incorporate some machine learning capabilities, including 
learning the preferences and habits of their owners.  These kinds of machines (state of the 
art cellphones) generally interact with and "learn from" a single human owner.  Yet, they 
interact with other virtual agents who communicate with them.  Now that we have these 
possibilities not available to Turing, we might consider following through in more detail 
on remarks that Turing made about "intellectual search" by humans immersed in a human 
community, and consider what the analogous processes for a machine might be.        
 
 
4  Imitation and Intelligence 
 
Turing concludes his 1948 paper "Intelligent Machinery" with a section on the concept of 
intelligence, which ends in the description of an experiment.  The experiment involves 
three people and the game of chess.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Harry Collins' research on imitation games extends this observation about the value of interactions with 
others.  He also ties the kind of knowledge gained in this way with the kind of knowledge that can be 
exhibited using imitation games. (http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/contactsandpeople/harrycollins/expertise-
project/imitationgameresearch.html )	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"It is not difficult to devise a paper machine which will play a not very bad game of 
chess.  Now get three [humans] as subjects for the experiment A, B, C.  A and C are 
to be rather poor chess players, B is the operator who works the paper machine.   . . 
. Two rooms are used with some arrangement for communicating moves, and a 
game is played between C  and either A or the paper machine.  C may find it 
difficult to tell which he is playing." (Turing 1948, p. 127)  
 
By 'paper machine', Turing means creating "the effect of a computing machine by writing 
down a set of rules of procedure and asking a man to carry them out. "  (Turing 1948, p. 
113)  So, the human who operates the paper machine, in conjunction with the written 
rules of procedure, is imitating a machine.  Now, although it is meant to be 
straightforward to imitate a machine by this method, Turing does not consider it trivially 
easy, for he advises using someone who is both a mathematician and a chess player to 
work the paper machine.     
 
Now, this experimental setup is most assuredly not intended to be an objective measure 
of intelligence of the paper machine.  To prevent any charge of interpretive license, let 
me quote Turing from this last section of the paper, which bears the heading "Intelligence 
as an emotional concept":  "The extent to which we regard something as behaving in an 
intelligent manner is determined as much by our own state of mind and training as by the 
properties of the object under consideration."   
 
Upon what, then, does regarding something as intelligent depend?  His answer is given in 
terms of what it is that would rule out regarding something as intelligent:  "If we are able 
to explain and predict its behaviour or if there seems to be little underlying plan, we have 
little temptation to imagine intelligence."  Different people bring different skills with 
respect to explaining and predicting the behavior of something:   "With the same object 
therefore it is possible that one man would consider it as intelligent and another would 
not; the second man would have found out the rules of its behavior." 
 
The experiment is set up as a comparison: between A, a "rather poor" chess player, and 
B, a paper machine.   The experiment is not in terms of whether B can beat A at chess -- 
the way the experiment is set up, B, which is a man imitating the behavior of a machine 
by implementing rules that could be carried out by a machine, but which are written by a 
human and intended to be read by a human, will likely win some rounds.  The 
comparison is not between chess-playing abilities, but between how transparent it is to C 
that B's behavior is being produced by following a set of written rules capable of being 
carried out by a machine.   
 
While "Intelligent Machinery" closed with the description of a three person game about 
telling the difference between a performance generated by 'rules of behavior' and one by 
a human, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" opened with such a three person 
game.  The three persons in the game (called an imitation game) were named A, B, and 
C, too, and C was to distinguish between A and B.  There was a difference, though:  the 
moves being communicated were not positions in a game of chess, but taking one's turn 
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in a conversation.  The distinction was not a matter of distinguishing between which 
player was a person and which a machine, but between which conversationalist was  a 
man and which was a woman.   
 
The experimental setup in Turing's 1950 paper that I dubbed "The Original Imitation 
Game Test" is very like a TV game show that premiered six years later, in 1956, called 
"To Tell The Truth."   It was played as follows:  
 
" Three challengers are introduced, all claiming to be the central character.   
[. . .] the host reads aloud a signed affadavit about the central character. 
The panelists are each given a period of time to question the challengers. Questions 
are directed to the challengers by number (Number One, Number Two and Number 
Three), with the central character sworn to give truthful answers, and the impostors 
permitted to lie and pretend to be the central character. 
After questioning is complete, each member of the panel votes on which of the 
challengers they believe to be the central character, [. . .] Once the votes are cast, 
the host asks, "Will the real [person's name] please stand up?" The central character 
then stands, [. . .] Prize money is awarded to the challengers based on the number of 
incorrect votes the impostors draw." ("To Tell the Truth", Wikipedia, downloaded 
Jan. 27, 2012. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_Tell_the_Truth#1956.E2.80.931968.2C_CBS ) 
 
Being a convincing imposter can be difficult.  In previously published work, I have 
argued that the OIG Test  is a better game than the one currently referred to as "the 
Turing Test."   (Sterrett 2000, Sterrett 2002a, Sterrett  2002b).  One reason I gave for my 
view was that the task given the machine in the OIG Test is the same as the task set  for 
the human in the OIG Test: to imitate something that it is not.3  The concept of a machine 
being set the task of imitation should not seem at all foreign here -- in fact, the term 
"imitation" is used by Turing in describing a universal machine; he speaks of the ability 
of a universal machine to imitate other machines.   Isn't imitation a straightforward task 
for a computer, then, you may ask?    
 
No, I don't think it is.  For an uneducated machine (such as an uneducated universal 
machine) to imitate is one thing -- it amounts to implementing a program.  For an 
educated machine to imitate is quite another.  In fact, I argued, what is called for is not 
really imitation, but figuring out and carrying out what it takes to be a convincing 
imposter.  While the central character in "To Tell the Truth" may give an answer to a 
question without any fear of being led to another question that he or she cannot answer, 
the imposter has to think how to keep the conversation from turning to topics that might 
present problems for an imposter.  An imposter has to constantly be on guard to override 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   In (Sterrett 2000) I also show that the two tests in (Turing 1950) give different quantitative, as well as 
qualitative, results.  I consider it a major contribution of (Sterrett 2000) to give what amounts to a proof that 
the two tests are unequivocably different on significant points, and that the OIG Test need not be set up 
around gender differences.  Secondary literature citing (Sterrett 2000) has not always recognized these two 
major points.  
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tendencies to respond in ways that have by now become habitual, but which are 
inappropriate while posing as an imposter.  Talk of overriding habits is, I believe, no 
longer fanciful talk, as reading about work done by robotics researchers on the difficulties 
faced in applying imitation learning in robotics will reveal.  If IBM is looking for 
suggestions for its next Grand Challenge, let me suggest "To Tell the Truth." 4 
 
I shall not repeat all the points I made in those earlier works on Turing and tests for 
intelligence.  Rather, my point in this talk about the OIG Test concerns a question 
germane to the education of Turing's Child-Machines.  I suggest that reflecting on the 
question of how machines produced using different methods for educating machines fare 
on the OIG Test leads to useful ways of thinking about machine intelligence.   
 
References  
 
BCS Computer Conservation Society (2002) "Recollections of early AI in Britain:  1942 - 1965". (video for 
the BCS Computer Conservation Society's October 2002 Conference on the history of AI in Britain)  
transcript downloaded from http://www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/events/ccs2002/CCS-early-british-ai-dmichie.pdf  on 
March 25, 2012. 
Floyd, Juliet (to appear) "Turing, Wittgenstein, and Types:  Philosophical Aspects of Turing's 'The Reform 
of Mathematical Notation and Phraseology' (1944-5)", in Alan Turing - His Work and Impact, eds. S. Barry 
Cooper and Jan van Leeuwen (The Collected Works of A. M. Turing, revised edn of North-Holland 2001, 
Elsevier). 
James, William (1890) The Principles of Psychology, Volume I.  New York: Henry Holt and company. 
Michie, Donald (1961) "Trial and Error", Science Survey, part 2, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 129 - 145.  
Quinn, Naomi (2003) "Cultural Selves"   Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1001: 145-176.  
Sterrett, S. G. (2002b) "Too Many Instincts: Contrasting Philosophical Views on Intelligence in Humans 
and Non-Humans", JETAI (Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence), Vol. 14, No. 1, 
pp. 39 - 60. Reprinted in Thinking About Android Epistemology, Edited by Ken Ford, Clark Glymour and 
Patrick Hayes, MIT Press (March 2006). 
Sterrett, S. G. (2002a) "Nested Algorithms and ´The Original Imitation Game Test´: A Reply to James 
Moor" Minds and Machines, Vol. 12, pp. 131-136.  
Sterrett, Susan G. (2000) "Turing´s Two Tests for Intelligence" Minds and Machines, Vol. 10, pp. 541-559. 
Reprinted in The Turing Test: The Elusive Standard of Artificial Intelligence. Edited by James H. Moor. 
Kluwer Academic, 2003. 
 
Turing, A.M. (1950).  Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433-460.  
 
Turing, A. M. (1948)  "Intelligent Machinery" in Mechanical Intelligence,  Collected Works of A. M. 
Turing.  D. C. Ince, ed.  North Holland, 1992, p. 107 -127.  
 
Wikipedia contributors. "To Tell the Truth." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia, 27 Jan. 2012. Web. 27 Jan. 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	    IBM's Deep Blue took on the challenge of a machine playing chess at the Grandmaster level.  IBM's 
Watson (with DeepQA technology) took on the challenge of competing in the game show Jeopardy!	  
